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In certain economic experiments, some participants willingly pay a cost to punish peers 
who contribute too little to the public good. Because such punishment can lead to improved 
group outcomes, this costly punishment has been conceived of as altruistic. Here we provide 
evidence that individual variation in the propensity to punish low contributions is unrelated to 
altruism. First, individual use of punishment was uncorrelated with contribution to the public 
good, contrary to the hypothesis that punishers are proximally motivated by prosocial 
preferences. Second, individual use of punishment was positively correlated across situations 
where the use of punishment is typically group beneficial and situations where the use of 
punishment is typically group detrimental, as well as across situations of radically different 
strategic structures. These findings contrast sharply with the premise that the tendency to use 
punishment can fruitfully be regarded as an adaptation for solving social dilemmas. 
 
 




Economic experiments have shown that people use costly punishment in public goods 
games more frequently than is expected from rational optimizers of financial gain (1-3). 
Often, though not always, this punishment is directed at those who have made low 
contributions to the public good. While contributions to the public good diminish over time in 
the absence of punishment, the addition of costly punishment, contingent on the particular 
usage of that punishment, can induce and sustain cooperation. Thus punishment, in some 
cases, appears to solve the first order social dilemma of the public goods game. This finding 
has inspired an ³DOWUXLVWLF´SXQLVKPHQWK\SRWKHVLV: human cooperation in social dilemmas is 
explained, in part, by the prevalence of individuals predisposed by evolution to pay the costs 
of punishing non-cooperators and thus sustain cooperation. Here we provide direct tests of 
both a motivational and an instrumental interpretation RIWKH³DOWUXLVWLF´SXQLVKPHQW 
hypotheses namely: i) Punishment is directly motivated by prosocial preferences. ii) 
Regardless of proximal motivation, individual propensity to punish is a (cultural) group level 
adaptation specifically for solving collective action problems. 
Under the motivational interpretation of the altruistic punishment hypothesis, punishment 
of low contributors should be correlated with other behaviors that are motivated by prosocial 
preferences. Although general patterns of behavior in the public goods game can be 
understood without invoking prosocial preferences (4), individual differences in contributions 
to the public good when there is no threat of punishment are related to individual differences 
in prosocial preferences (5). Therefore, within groups playing a public goods game the 
motivational interpretation of the altruistic punishment hypothesis predicts individual 
variation in contributions (in a condition with no punishment) to be correlated with use of 
punishment against low contributors (in a punishment condition).  
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 Under an instrumental interpretation of the altruistic punishment hypothesis, the 
propensity to engage in costly punishment of low contributors is viewed as an adaptation for 
solving social dilemmas. For this to be the case altruistic punishers should differentiate 
between those situations where punishment benefits the group and where punishment is 
detrimental for the group, and selectively employ punishment only when it will be of benefit. 
This assumption can be tested by comparing individual punishment behavior across distinct 
strategic situations. 
Both the motivational and the instrumental inteUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKH³DOWUXLVWLF´SXQLVKHU
hypothesis can be tested within the experimental paradigm that inspired the hypothesis in the 
first place.  We use the extensive cross-cultural data on behavior in public goods games, with 
and without punishment, assembled by Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter (6). Their study showed 
that the group benefit of costly punishment is contingent on the particular usage of costly 
punishment, and further that there are stable cross-cultural patterns in usage. Specifically, in 
some countries punishment of high contributors was so common that contributions were no 
higher with punishment than without punishment. While the original analysis focused on 
cross-cultural variation, the focus of our reanalysis is on individual variation in use of 
punishment. In addition, we also conducted a new experiment to test whether individual 
punishment behaviors are correlated across situations with radically different strategic 
structure. To obtain a simple but strategically radical modification of the public goods game 
we made contributions vicarious instead of voluntary. 
Methods 
Herrmann et al. (6) conducted their experiment in 16 cities across the world. A total of 
1120 participants were assigned to 280 fixed groups with four participants in each group. 
Each group took part in 20 periods of a repeated public goods game that followed a standard 
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protocol. In each period, players made voluntary contributions to a public account, which was 
multiplied by a factor of 1.6 and redistributed equally to all players regardless of their 
contribution. During the first ten periods no opportunities to punish other players were 
provided. During the last ten periods participants were given an opportunity to punish other 
players after contributions had been made and revealed. Specifically, a player might reduce 
other players¶SURILWVDWDFRVWRIXQLWIRUHYHU\XQLWVRISURILWUHGXFWLRQFor all further 
details we refer to the original paper.  
For the new experiment, one hundred sixty participants (54% male, average age 28 years) 
were recruited from a pool of volunteers, primarily students at a university in Sweden. 
Participants were assigned to one of 40 fixed groups with four participants in each group. 
Each group took part in 32 periods of a repeated public goods game played over a local 
computer network. In each period every participant received an endowment of 20 units and 
contributions from these endowments to the common pot were doubled and distributed 
equally to all group members. These 32 periods were broken into four separate treatments, 
each a distinct variant of the public goods game iterated for eight periods. Two treatments 
were similar to the first study. The other two treatments used the vicarious contribution 
mechanism, first without punishment and then with punishment. Players could be punished on 
the basis of the vicarious contributions they had chosen for others, again at a cost to the 
punisher of 1 unit for every 3 units of lost profit inflicted. In addition it was made clear to 
potential punishers which contribution was made on their behalf. Full instructions are 





We first report results from our reanalysis of data from (6), and then turn to results from 
the new experiment. Two-tailed tests are used throughout with significance level 0.05. 
Frequencies of different uses of punishment 
In order to analyze individual variation in uses of punishment in (6), contributions to the 
public good were categorized as low, median, or high, depending on how they compared to 
WKHJURXS¶VPHGLDQFRQWULEXWLRQLQWKHVDPHSHULRG. Every participant had opportunity to 
punish each of three other group members in each of ten periods, for a total of 33,600 
punishment opportunities (29% of which were of low contributors, 27% of high contributors, 
and 43% of median contributors). Punishment was used with very different frequencies 
GHSHQGLQJRQWKHWDUJHW¶VFRQWULEXWLRQZKHUHDVRIRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRSXQLVKORZ
contributions were used, high contributions were punished only 18% of the time, and median 
contributions only 8%. Note that this pattern is consistent with most punishment being 
triggered by norm violations (7), where deviation downwards from the median is more 
provocative than deviation upwards. 
The effect on group outcome of different uses of punishment  
For each group we calculated the total effect of punishment on contributions DVWKHJURXS¶V
WRWDOFRQWULEXWLRQRYHUWKHWHQSHULRGVZLWKSXQLVKPHQWPLQXVWKHJURXS¶VWRWDOFRQWULEXWLRQ
over the preceding ten periods with no punishment.  For each group we also computed the 
frequencies with which punishment was used per opportunity to punish low, median, and high 
contributions. Table 1 reports the results of a linear regression predicting the total effect of 
punishment on contributions from the three frequencies of different kinds of punishment 
(explaining 26.3% of the total variance). As expected, punishment of low contributions had a 
positive effect on contributions, whereas punishment of high contributions had a negative 
effect. Also punishment of median contributions had a negative effect on contributions, 
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although not as large. As the negative effect of punishment of median contributions has no 
straightforward interpretation, our subsequent analysis will focus on the other two uses of 
punishment.  
Table 1. Linear regression predicting the total RIHIIHFWRISXQLVKPHQWRQDJURXS¶V
contributions from the frequencies with which different uses of punishment were used in the 
group. 
 beta t p 
punishment of low .37 6.08 <.001 
punishment of median -.22 -2.86 .005 
punishment of high -.28 -3.58 <.001 
Note. Betas are standardized coefficients. 
 
Individual differences in uses of punishment 
7KURXJKRXWWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKLVUHVXOWVVHFWLRQ³FRUUHODWLRQ´ZLOODOZD\VUHIHUWR
Spearman correlation. For every participant we computed the relative frequencies with which 
the participant used opportunities to punish low contributors and high contributors. A 
frequency was left undefined if there was not a single opportunity on which to base it. Within 
each group of four participants we computed the correlation between the two frequencies as a 
measure of the extent to which frequent punishers of high contributors also tended to be 
frequent punishers of low contributors. This correlation was defined for the 182 (out of 280) 
groups where both frequencies were defined and had non-zero variation. As presented in 
Figure 1(a), these within-group correlations were mostly positive and the mean correlation 
was significantly greater than zero, M = 0.29, SD = 0.53, t(181) = 7.43, p < .001. Analysis by 
city yielded a positive mean correlation in each of the 16 cities (ranging from 0.06 in Athens, 
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Greece, to 0.65 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). Thus, it may be a universal tendency that 




Figure 1. Distributions of the within-group correlations between individual use of 
punishment against low contributors and (a) use of punishment against high contributors, (b) 
individual contributions in condition without punishment.  
Correlations between inGLYLGXDO¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVDQGWKHLUXVHRISXQLVKPHQW 
 To assess the relation between altruism and use of punishment we computed each 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VWRWDOFRQWULEXWLRQRYHUWKHWHQSHULRGVZLWKRXWSXQLVKPHQW:LWKLQHDFKJURXS
we measured the extent to which those who made relatively high contributions (without 
punishment) tended to be frequent users of punishment against low contributors. The mean 
correlation was not significantly different from zero (M = -0.01, SD = 0.58, based on 247 
groups). Thus, individual variation in punishment behavior was independent from individual 
variation in contribution behavior; see Figure 1(b). 
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Voluntary and vicarious contributions to the public good 
Intrigued by the finding that individual use of punishment against high and low contributors 
is correlated, we wanted to test whether individual variation in punishment use was correlated 
across a diverse, yet comparable, sample of strategic situations. Specifically, we sought to 
contrive a strategic structure such that punishment of high, rather than low, contributors 
would be the more frequent use of punishment. To this end we added treatments where 
contributions to the public good were vicarious instead of voluntary. In these treatments, at 
the beginning of each period every player was assigned a vicarious donor, another group 
member who decided on a FRQWULEXWLRQRQWKDWSOD\HU¶VEHKDOI. Note that WKHYLFDULRXVGRQRU¶V
interest is aligned with the collective interest but opposed to the selfish interest of the group 
member on whose behalf the contribution is made. Whereas voluntary contributions showed a 
marked increase with punishment, Figure 2 shows that vicarious contributions were high 
already without punishment and did not increase with punishment.  
 




Shift in use of punishment under voluntary and vicarious contributions 
 
Figure 3. Total proportions of opportunities to punish voluntary contributors and vicarious 
GRQRUVRQSXQLVKHU¶VEehalf when they made low, median, and high contributions. 
 
Figure 3 shows the total frequencies of punishment per opportunity, against voluntary 
FRQWULEXWRUVDQGDJDLQVWWKHSXQLVKHU¶VYLFDULRXVGRQRUFirst, note that results for voluntary 
contributions closely replicate the pattern found in the first study. Second, note that the 
punishment pattern is reversed for the vicarious donor: vicarious contributions RQDSXQLVKHU¶V
behalf were much more likely to be punished when they were high than when they were low.  
Importantly, this shift in use of punishment can be observed also on the level of 
individuals. Consider the subset of participants who punished low voluntary contributions at 
least once but never punished high voluntary contributions. These would be the strongest 
candidates for LQGLYLGXDOVFRQVLVWHQWO\XVLQJSXQLVKPHQW³DOWUXLVWLFDOO\´1RQHWKHOHVVZKHQ
the setting changed to vicarious contributions most of them changed their punishment 
behavior: the majority (60%) used at least one opportunity to punish their vicarious donor for 
making a high contribution on their behalf; in contrast, only a minority (37%) used any 
opportunity to punish their vicarious donor for making a low contribution on their behalf. 
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CRUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOV¶ use of punishment of voluntary and vicarious contributions 
 Focusing only on voluntary contributions to begin with, the findings of the first study were 
replicated in this experiment: the mean correlation between the two uses of punishment was 
positive (M = 0.41, SD = 0.45, t(23) = 4.50, p < .001; based on 24 groups), whereas use of 
punishment against low contributors was not significantly correlated with high contributions 
in the absence of punishment (M = 0.09, SD = 0.54; based on 36 groups),. 
The main point of the new experiment was to study whether individual differences in 
propensity to use punishment correlated across the two strategic structures (regardless of 
whether the target contribution was high or low). Indeed they did. As presented in Figure 4, 
within-groXSFRUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOV¶IUHTXHQF\RISXQLVKPHQWRIYROXQWDU\
contributors and their frequency of punishment of their vicarious donor were mostly positive 
with mean significantly greater than zero (M = 0.30, SD = 0.55, t(32) = 3.19, p = .003; based 
on 33 groups). 
 
Figure 4. Histogram over the distribution of the within-group correlations between 
individual use of punishment against voluntary contributors and against vicarious donors on 




Above two key findings emerged regarding individual differences in use of costly 
punishment. First, use of punishment was unrelated to prosociality (measured by contributions 
to a public good under no threat of punishment). Second, use of punishment showed 
significant consistency across distinct situations: The same individuals tended to be the most 
frequent punishers of both high and low contributors, and of both voluntary and vicarious 
contributions. This consistency across situations is remarkable given that the effect of 
punishment tends to be positive for the group in some situations and negative in others. These 
findings have implications for both the proximate mechanisms driving costly punishment and 
the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms.  
Before turning to the implications of our findings we wish to address a limitation of our 
study, which was pointed out by an astute reviewer: The positive correlation between 
punishment of low contributors and of high contributors could in theory be driven by 
participants who do not understand what the punishment option is all about and therefore use 
it regardless of contribution levels. First, note that it would be extremely problematic for this 
entire experimental paradigm if it were the case that punishment in these experiments is 
driven by poor understanding. NRGDWDRQLQGLYLGXDOSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ comprehension of the 
experiment are available for the study of Herrmann et al. (6). However, there are clear 
indications that it is very rare that participants use punishment indiscriminately. In particular, 
recall that median level contributors were punished very rarely in this experiment (whereas 
above-median contributions were punished more than twice as often). The result of the second 
study (Figure 3) that participants dramatically shift in what level of contributions they prefer 




The first implication of our findings regards how personality traits help shape behavior in 
economic games. The basic premise of personality psychology is that individuals show 
consistent patterns of behavior across diverse situations. Recently Yamagishi et al. (8) found 
that prosocial behaviors are correlated across a variety of distinct strategic situations and also 
correlate with the personality trait social value orientation. Our finding that contribution 
behaviors and punishment behaviors are uncorrelated suggests that prosocial preferences, 
though they act broadly across multiple strategic situations, are not major determinants of 
punishment behavior. This is in agreement with the recent finding of Yamagishi and 
colleagues (9) that rejection of low offers in the ultimatum game (long viewed as a form of 
altruistic punishment) is uncorrelated with various helping behaviors. Use of punishment and 
sanctions instead appear to be related to patience and impulsivity (10, 11), normative 
considerations (7, 12-15), and genetic correlates of aggression (16).  
Thus, an accumulating body of evidence suggests that punishment behaviors and prosocial 
behaviors do not share the same proximal motivations. This, however, says nothing about the 
possibility that the propensity to punish may have been selected for as a means of maintaining 
cooperation. 
A decade ago the notion that costly punishment behavior may be a specific adaptation to 
social dilemmas was popularized (3), though see (17, 18). A recent meta-analysis has 
confirmed that the effects of punishment on cooperative behavior in social dilemma 
experiments tend to be positive on average (19). Nonetheless, the case for this particular 
evolutionary origin of punishment is weakened by experiments showing that the group-
beneficial effects of punishment are easily nullified by cultural conditions (6, 20) or by adding 
an opportunity for costly counter-punishment (21), suggesting that the provision of 
punishment cannot generally be considered a public good (22).  
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Our findings highlight an additional problem, namely the premise that costly punishment is 
an adaptation to a specific strategic situation. The assumption of situational specificity is 
implicit in all evolutionary models, e.g. (23-28). Our findings require that this premise be 
reconsidered because it is inconsistent with the actual observed patterns of individual 
punishment use. Recall that we found the propensity to engage in costly peer-to-peer 
punishment to be correlated across situations where punishment is beneficial and where 
punishment is detrimental, both for the punisher and their group.  
If the same set of proximate mechanisms (such as impulsivity, normative sensitivity, and 
aggression) determine punishment behavior across various situations, as the correlation 
between punishment behaviors across situations suggests, then the payoffs associated with 
any one particular situation cannot be used to model the evolution of punishment. Instead the 
relative evolutionary significance of each situation where punishment occurs and the impacts 
of punishment in that situation must be considered in aggregate. The task of the evolutionary 
theorist becomes more complicated still if the proximal motivators of punishment also impact 
other non-punishment behaviors. In this case the relative evolutionary significance of each 
situation where a given proximal motivator affects behavior and the impact of that proximal 
motivator on the outcome of the situation must be considered in aggregate. This situation can 
be viewed as analogous to the biological situation of pleiotropy where multiple traits are 
influenced by a single gene, resulting in the selective pressures on that gene being determined 
not by the fitness effect of any one particular trait, but by the aggregate fitness effects of each 
trait associated with the gene. In the case of costly punishment it appears likely that a small 
set of proximal motivators create a consistent pattern of punishment use across a variety of 
situations. For instance, to the extent that use of punishment is determined by aggression and 
aggression is genetically influenced (16), one must consider the aggregate fitness effects of 
aggression across the multitude of relevant situations. This makes it impossible to view 
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punishment behavior in any one particular situation (e.g., the public goods game) as an 
adaptation. Indeed, in the rich and rapidly changing context of human social life, it remains an 
open question as to whether punishment-prone individuals are on average an asset or a 
problem for their groups. 
We hope these findings will spur empiricist and theoreticians to consider the evolution of 
personality traits, normative behavior, and the interaction of the two within the context of 
multiple strategically distinct but perceptually similar game situations. 
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